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FULL TEXT

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PROFESSOR BEERS: "Tonight we're talking about the CIA. And Mr. Lindsay and I were just discussing these recent revelations earlier this year about the channelling of money from CIA through various foundations to organizations -- political -- like the National Student Association or Encounter magazine, some trade union organization. This, as you know, has caused a tremendous disturbance in professional circles and elsewhere -- trade union circles, liberal circles, newspapers."

"How do you -- how do you explain this -- how did it ever get started? How did the CIA ever get started in the business of giving money to an organization like the National Student Association?"

FRANK LINDSAY: "I think one has to go back to the -- the times immediately after World War II when CIA was organized. It was a time in which the Soviet Union was exerting very powerful force to try to capture and control public organizations -- mass organizations -- whether labor unions or political parties -- throughout the free world. And it was time too that there had been a takeover in Czechoslovakia. There was concern -- major concern was in the United States as to where all this might lead. And a short run, an immediate crisis developed in which a few able Americans suddenly found themselves completely outnumbered and without the resources that they needed and such resources that they did have from their own sources were completely inadequate and it began in those days and under those circumstances of crisis, where CIA provided on an emergency basis, amounts of money to supplement from their own inadequate sources of funds."

BEERS: "Well, this is certainly true of the students, I mean, the NSA belonged to a thing called the International Union of Students, I think was the name wasn't it? And this I think was more or less Communist controlled. Then they set up another organization. And then they also would at times go to some of the Communist organized festivals elsewhere."

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LYMAN KIRKPATRICK: "World Federation of Democratic Youth and -- the World Federation of Trade Unions were all Communist front organizations which in the early '50's practically had the field to themselves because there wasn't any money and there weren't cohesive and dynamic organizations in the West that could oppose them."

BEERS: "Well, why'd this have to be done secretly? I mean this -- of course, today this is the thing that's the nub of the objections."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think you have to recreate the atmosphere of the 50's in which, if you remember in our domestic politics, we had one party which was trying to make the Communists the scapegoats for all foreign policy failures. And the attitude of where would you put the money and who would be allowed to do it. It would have become, I think, a fairly major national debate as to who you subsidized and who you didn't. The very fact that during the revelations of this past year that we had the extreme right accusing the CIA of subsidizing socialist type organizations...."

BEERS: "That's true."

KIRKPATRICK: "And the liberals accusing CIA of subsidizing right type organizations. Seems to me CIA must have been fairly close to right because both sides were accusing them of being wrong."

LINDSAY: "There was a point at which McCarthy proposed to investigate the CIA for Communist infiltration."

KIRKPATRICK: "In fact, during the notorious Army-McCarthy hearings I just returned to the Agency at that point from an unanticipated leave and became the McCarthy case officer to Mr. Dulles, who was Director. And during the McCarthy hearings the Senator would periodically stand up and say that the most serious problem we have is the Central Intelligence Agency and the Communists that have infiltrated this. Every time he did it, Mr. Dulles would write him and say, Senator, I heard your allegations on television yesterday, and would you kindly submit me the evidence that you have. Which of course was never received."

BEERS: "But see the -- the -- it does, as we now know, it has these bad results, and this was potentially there all the time. I mean, it was dishonest. I mean, you know, here's the American Student Union, organization, and if it -- if it, you know, one of the central things certainly was it was independent, that was the whole difference supposedly, between the American organization and the -- and the Communist one. And yet it comes out that they are equally -- well, not equally dependent, but also dependent. I think this is the -- the danger in the thing. Wasn't that considered?"

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KIRKPATRICK: "Well, yes, of course it was considered, too. But I think in order to put it into proper perspective -- and Frank Lindsay, of course, was directly concerned with some of these aspects from his work in the government -- was that it was a strict subsidy as far as CIA was concerned. I think even the student organizations have brought this out that they weren't told specifically what to do or how to do it. They were given money to do a general job. And they were not agents in the sense of the word of controlled agents doing that -- that particular aspect."

"It was a subsidy. It was money coming to them which couldn't come from foundations or couldn't come in an open grant from Congress, but could be made available in this particular direction."

BEERS: "Was it that -- really that much of a no strings attached grant?"

LINDSAY: "Yes, certainly it's my impression that that was the case at the outset. And I have reason to believe that it hasn't been generally true that essentially the purposes for which these funds were used were perfectly acceptable. Activities that there was, as Lyman Kirkpatrick says, a high degree of independence. The only real weaknesses, as you point out -- it was the source was hidden. And that sooner or later I suspect it was found to come out with the damage that has occurred. And I -- to me, I think the weakness have been that what started off to be an emergency...."

BEERS: "Yes."

LINDSAY: "A short term, because there was no other source of funds, became the easy solution on a continuing basis, both for the government and for private society, which I think has to -- the whole of the American society has to take responsibility in the sense that there were neither private funds adequate to do these important jobs -- and perfectly acceptable open jobs -- there were inadequate private funds, and the government could not find an overt acceptable way to do what otherwise is perfectly acceptable."

BEERS: "Well, what -- what about the point of the 'no strings' because I think that has been questioned. Now, you -- you've been in OSS and CIA 23 years, no recently the Executive Director -- it's been said that -- that the CIA would then ask these officials of the NSA who were in on the know to give them reports on foreign student leaders and so on, which, I can imagine, this would be useful. In this sense it was not exactly 'no strings attacked,' was it?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think here on the reports, I -- I -- I watched and listened and read all of the discussion of this in the last year, and I think as far as the reports are concerned it was mainly directed toward, is this a useful direction in which to put our money? When you say 'no strings'...."

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BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "I don't mean literally in the sense that here's a bushel basket full of greenbacks, and, go out and have a gay time with them. No. The -- the money was directed toward the purpose of encouraging student organizations that were aligned with the west and anti-Communists of assisting (?) student leaders that were motivated in this particular direction. And obviously you'd want to know whether the money was going in the right direction.

"But the implication that this was espionage or spying, I think is just totally wrong. I think this is the same as any corporation would ask, as to whether its advertising money, or its promotion money was going in the right direction.

"I can speak fairly frankly on this because my last several years in the Agency as Controller, I had an obligation in about four different directions, to the Bureau of the Budget, to the Congress of the United States, and more remotely, of course, to the taxpayer, to see that the dollar was well spent. And I was constantly questioning, are we accomplishing with the dollar what we want?"

BEERS: "A good point. It's pretty hard to give them money without there being some kind of strings."

KIRKPATRICK: "You have to ask, and Dr. Beer, the thing, of course, there that I think that people seem to look on CIA as the source of limitless funds. It has modest -- it has a modest budget basically as far as our government's concerned. And by contrast with the opposite numbers in the Communist world, it's minute by comparison. When you look at the fact that in 1957 in the Youth Festival at Moscow, it's conservatively estimated they spent \$100,000,000 for that one youth festival."

BEERS: "A hundred -- the Russians spent a hundred million dollars on one...."

KIRKPATRICK: "The Russians spent a hundred million dollars on one youth festival. Which is more, I think, than the total subsidy of the National Student Association, and was, over the entire period."

BEERS: "Many, many times more, yes."

"But how about Mr. Lindsay's question, supposing we understand how this began in an emergency situations, why does it go on?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think the answer to that, quite frankly, is it went

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on because perhaps there weren't any other ways that were usually visible, for one. Secondly, obviously the recipients weren't fighting against receiving the money. When the money is coming and coming on a regular basis, that's quite important. One of the -- the arguments against government subside always is the -- the one year appropriation, or the two year, at most, appropriation, they don't have any sssurance for the future. I think the President's got something in mind on the aid program in this regar right now.

"And even the people that were handling the -- the youth organizations from within the government felt the same way about it.

"Sure, I think that in -- in 20-20 hindsight, one can say, well we ought to have stopped this in the early '60's."

BEERS: "Was it that hard to see? I mean, you think of it now, I mean, there's the intrinsic Fact of the dishonesty in some cases. And then, secondly, the fact that it tends to be self defeating when it comes out. And, you know, pretty hard to keep things secret in the American government."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I wonder there whether the rejoinder wouldn't be that occasionally we're -- we're just too afraid of -- of using techniques that are almost the only techniques available in these fields. And I -- I -- I seriously question as to how this present proposal for an open foundation is going to progress when Congress starts to nit-pick at the appropriation."

LINDSAY: "I don't know, I think I disagree a little bit. I think I tend to agree with you that -- that serious damage has been done, not only to the organizations which were involved, in terms of how they were regarded, but also, as you mentioned earlier, to others who may go abroad, and it's the easiest thing in the world now to charge anybody with this background, and make it stick, as 'oh, he's.another CIA agent'. So I think there is -- a price has been paid for this...."

BEERS: "You see, I'm a political scientist. I have colleagues who go into other countries, you know, South America, Europe, elsewhere, Africa -- and they want to go with clean hands, and say, I'm here, just as independent scholar. But the fact that some way or another foundations have financed this kind of thing, and it's been kept secret, would make it difficult in many instances, for these people -- in this sense I mean self defeating."

KIRKPATRICK: "Oh, I don't think there's any question about the damage that was done. But I think in looking at why the damage was done, that it's not quite fair to simply say because the CIA didn't cut it off, and say, didn't do it otherwise. I

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think part of the damage was done simply in -- in what became almost a orgy of self recrimination and widening the credibility gap until it became the Grand Canyon."

BEERS: "How about the -- the other -- the controls within the governmental structure -- this is related to this -- if people in the CIA didn't think, or didn't feel they could make this cut, what about the Congress and the policy makers in the Executive Branch?"

LINDSAY: "Well, I...."

BEERS: "This in a way is their responsibility."

LINDSAY: "Go back on one point here. The assumption is as I have understood it recently, and Lyman can correct me, that there were efforts from time to time to reduce these activities, and to find other open publicly knowledgeable sources and that -- that the control, if you want to call it that, that existed, was -- was strongly in favor of continuing these activities by CIA."

BEERS: "In other words...."

KIRKPATRICK: "That's absolutely right, Frank, over the years, of course, there've been strong elements in the government -- the Bureau of the Budget is a very strong and rather silent element in the government which is constantly putting pressure on the Executive agencies that cut down federal expenditures -- particularly if they can be converted to private subsidies from non-government sources. And over the years there is a great deal of pressure on, this -- particularly on the people that were working in this field, to cut back. But it almost invariably ended up at a fairly high level session in the White House at which the decision was made, well, we can't either find the funds, or if they were found they were on a very limited basis -- and some were -- so we must continue to do it because it'll be too bad to lose what we've...."

BEERS: "How do you feel about this, Bill? You've been working in the Harvard Defense Seminar in Subjects related to this."

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: * "Well, on the -- the NSA crisis or incident, it's ironic in a way, because the government had just about pulled out, as I understand it from some of the NSA officers, they had felt that the strings, which I agree, didn't exist at the beginning, except general guidelines and reports to -- to know where the money was going -- that the strings had become a little stronger, little tighter and -- and they didn't like it. And I think even some of the people involved on the government side were uneasy, and the students decided to look for private financing. And they were -- they were getting

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most of their money in the last year from private sources. And as I understand it, from the president, in '64 or five, he had managed to get legitimate private support for just about all of it. And they had only...."

BEERS: "The president of NSA?"

MAN: "Yes. I believe they only had something like a \$10,000 lease on -- on their offices, that was left from CIA money. And they wanted to get out but they wanted to do it quietly, because they knew the damage that might be done. And they almost succeeded. And it was unintentional, and really no one who had been sworn to secrecy, who intentionally gave it away."

BEERS: "How about this point of -- of control? I mean, here's a pretty big and vital agency of the government, and it certainly isn't subject to as much public revelation of its operations than most other agencies are."

MAN: "I think...."

BEERS: "What do you think about these controls?"

MAN: "I think there probably are more controls than are generally known. And in part I think one of the problems has been CIA public relations, and a reluctance on their part, and a reluctance on the part of the Congressional committees which exercise the control to acknowledge the control. For example, they don't publish a list of the members of the committees -- there are found Congressional committees."

BEERS: "How many?"

MAN: "Four."

BEERS: "Regularly established."

MAN: "Regularly established. And the one in the Senate is under the chairmanship of Senator Richard Russell -- one of the most powerful members of the Senate; knowledgeable; chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The committees with the Congressional control is -- is actually quite stringent, and in the July 1966 debates over whether the control should be enlarged, Senator Russell said that he didn't know of any agency which had its budget looked over more carefully than the CIA. And Senator Stennis said that he didn't know of any chairman of any subcommittee that took such an interest as -- as Senator Russell.

"Now, I know they were in the middle of a debate, but...."

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BEERS: "Yes."

MAN: "These are men who've been around. And I think there is great control there, plus control from the Bureau of the Budget. And of course, within the White House, and within the agencies themselves."

BEERS: "Does the Bureau of the Budget have a budget review -- an examination of the same type that it has for other agencies, for the CIA?"

MAN: "It -- it's not of exactly the same type but it's smaller in part because of these security problems. But they get quite knowledgeable people, and often people who have been in CIA, and as someone put it, who know where the money's hidden."

BEERS: "Yes."

MAN: "So they're -- they're quite knowledgeable."

BEERS: "Well, now for instance, I mean, you know, if it was an agriculture committee, I mean, the members of the agriculture committee would know not only what the budget was but they would know the general course of policy if Freeman was going to change price supports, they'd know. But I mean, was -- was it Russell who said he didn't know about the Bay of Pigs."

MAN: "He said he didn't know about the Bay of Pigs, but Senator Cannon made a speech to the effect that they knew and had very carefully scrutinized the development of the U-2 and had appropriated the money every year. And since -- since Russell's statement about the Bay of Pigs, I believe that his committee has been more carefully informed than it was in the past.

"And one of the effects -- one of the few advantageous results of a book called 'The Invisible Government' -- which is highly misleading, in most respects, and did a great deal of damage -- but one of the few useful effects of the book was to make those responsible for oversight well aware of their oversight responsibilities."

BEERS: "In the Congress?"

MAN: "In the Congress and in -- in the Executive Branch, in the -- in the White House and I believe those who were charged with oversight responsibility take it even more seriously than they did before."

BEERS: "Yes."

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MAN: "The so-called 5412, or special group has some responsibilities."

BEERS: "The whole -- the group within the Executive...."

MAN: "That's one of the groups within the Executive Branch. And one of the members of that group explained that -- last year that their oversight was far more detailed and stringent than it'd ever been before."

BEERS: "How about looking at this in a little more in perspective, because the CIA, after all, has done a few other things besides subsidize the National Student Association.

"What are the general -- what are the general functions of the organization ? You've looked at it from the broad perspective of government service."

LINDSAY: "I think this is an important question here and -- and this particular issue may get little out of -- our of focus, in the sense that -- that there are many other functions which take a great deal of money, and that certainly my impression, that the political activity function we've been discussing in terms of funds, is a very tiny part of the total. Certainly the traditional intelligence functions are a major part. And I think there are some changes that are going on here that are very interesting. That -- that less and less information is coming from the traditional, the classical, human spy."

BEERS: "The James Bond."

LINDSAY: "The J ames Bond. I think that in one sense far more very important intelligence is coming from technical means. And certainly the U-2 is one of the acknowledged devices here. And obviously to develop an aircraft of those capabilities was a very expensive operation indeed.

"I think increasingly a great deal of very useful information is simply coming from very painstaking economic, political analysis. Largely derived of -- based on information derived from over sources."

BEERS: "What do you mean, magazines?"

LINDSAY: "Magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, and all sorts of -- of perfectly open information, reports, economic reports that are issued by other governments themselves form a basis...."

BEERS: "What are you trying to find out there? What kinds of things?"

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LINDSAY: "Well, obviously the -- the -- the most immediate and the most important things are related to -- to defense capabilities and advances in defense capabilities of countries such as the Soviet Union and China. And here the government is trying to find out as best it can to make an accurate evaluation of how far along defense systems are, or new missile systems, or the -- the present ABM system. And this can have tremendous impact on the United States, on its defense policy, on hand it can -- can save us from over-reacting to a threat that is not in fact as great as many have been believed -- such as the missile gap, or believed missile gap."

BEERS: "What about the missile gap? Now, this is an intelligence question, and you had some connection with this on the Gather (?) Committee, although that isn't strictly CIA, I guess. Now that -- would you tell us about that. That was a tough one to figure out. Wasn't it?"

LINDSAY: "Yes, and I'm -- I'm not sure that I'm really as qualified as -- as Lyman, to discuss this, other than I think that -- that that particular time, the Gather Committee Report, that the information -- there were some major gaps in information which later were closed by technical means, which tended to -- to give a more complete picture than was available previously."

BEERS: "For a while we thought there was a missile gap, and then...."

LINDSAY: "Yes."

BEERS: "...a year or so later we found there wasn't much of a missile gap."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, let's put it this way. Basically speaking the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency is to keep our policy makers fully informed of what's going on in the world so that they can make the correct policy.

"And it seems to me the best way to graphically illustrate this is simply to look at your defense budget. The Defense Department right now is putting together the budget for fiscal year 1969, which has to be approved by Congress, the session starting next January, hopefully to be passed by June 30th, so that they can have the money to spend on weapons which would then go to the drawing boards and would take two years on the drawing boards, and maybe another three years getting through serial production. So if you start in July 1968, by July 1973, the first of your new aircraft or new guns, or new tanks, whatever they are, are coming off the production line."

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"The role of intelligence in this is to say what weapons must be needed in 1973, to oppose what other major forces in the world you might be fighting. And if intelligence is wrong you can end up with the wrong weapons for the wrong war. So that it's vital and essential that you not just simply say, well, look, we saw the parade in Moscow the other day of the seven new aircraft, because they're basically obsolete the day they fly, because of the new types coming on behind them. What the Defense Department must know is what the Russians have got now going off their drawing boards that will be coming in the mid-70's. And Mr. McNamara obviously wants to know this from intelligence. So intelligence is constantly having to project forward this. And, as Frank has mentioned, it's -- it's coming from all sorts of sources, technical being a very -- there's been sort of a scientific explosion in intelligence collection in modern times. Having well surpassed the human agent, who's still important, because even technicians can't get inside the Kremlin -- you want to get the minutes of those meetings -- to sit in with the Politburo."

BEERS: "Have you succeeded in getting the minutes of the meetings?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think -- I think our record has been fairly good from that point of view. Colonel Penkovskiy was widely advertised, and I don't think the Russians still know how much he passed over."

BEERS: "Was he a member of their KGB?"

KIRKPATRICK: "He was in the -- the scientific committee, he was a regular officer of the scientific committee in charge of foreign liaison. But he had the highest clearances and had access to a great deal of material. He wasn't -- no, he wasn't strictly -- to answer your question, he was not KGB."

BEERS: "Still, that's"

KIRKPATRICK: "Security."

BEERS: "Close enough to tell you what you wanted to know."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, the fact he had access to it. I might just say here that is a good illustration of what people with this James Bond syndrome we have now seem to think that intelligence is always this fellow in the fast car with beautiful girls who can whip into a room and reach into the safe and bring all the top secrets."

BEERS: "Well, that helps your recruits of people for the organization, doesn't it?"

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KIRKPATRICK: "Well, it does in a way but occasionally they're looking for more glamor than hard work, and it's usually the latter."

BEERS: "Some of the wrong people."

KIRKPATRICK: "Some of the wrong people perhaps, because what you're really looking for are the hard facts. Your spies that can produce the top secret documents are very few and far between, so the real heroes of the intelligence war are the analysts sitting in Washington putting little bits and pieces together and coming up with a -- a prototype of what you're looking for. That -- that's what the intelligence agency is doing. But I think with all of the furor over the National Student Association and with the -- the James Bond stories and the Bay of Pigs, and the U-2, and items like that, the people overlook the fact that what intelligence really is is the putting together of this vast amount of material by good scholarly type of people who want to concentrate on finding out the facts."

BEERS: "You mean you have economists, engineers, and...."

KIRKPATRICK: "If I could just take another minute."

BEERS: "Sure, go ahead."

KIRKPATRICK: "The -- my favorite anecdote about the Cuban missile crisis, which I think is one of the most remarkable of modern times, of the inter relationship of intelligence and policy, was the development of what Mr. McNamara and his post mortum television broadcast called, I believe, the cratologists. And the cratologists were the economists in the intelligence system, both in the Pentagon and State and CIA who looked at all of these hundreds and hundreds of pictures of Russian ships carrying material to Cuba with crates on the desks -- decks -- and trying to analyze what was in those crates, and finally, simply by virtue of having looked at hundreds and hundreds of pictures of crates, they started to put together the medium bombers and the missiles that the crates were carrying and the facts bore out the fact that they had succeeded in deducing...."

BEERS: "Where it began from that hypothesis -- it was on the crates...."

KIRKPATRICK: "Exactly."

BEERS: "...that made you look for the things on land."

KIRKPATRICK: "Exactly. And the economists and the -- the photo interpreters and the other analysts that were studying these pictures taken together with all of the other information that they had together were able to start and analyze the -- what

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was in the crates. I've often thought that as a result of this the Russians have probably had to develop an anti-cratalogist department to build crates with new wrinkles in them to confuse the photo interpreters."

BEERS: "Well, how about the -- how about the -- the spotting of the missiles on the ground? Now, of course, at the time, they were -- they were -- there was one Senator who said, well, they've got some missiles. Wasn't this the case?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Senator Keating."

BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "Senator Keating."

BEERS: "And then...."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, they did have missiles...."

BEERS: "...the Administration said, well, no we haven't any reason to think so. And others were really going -- deductively saying, no, the Russians wouldn't do anything that foolish. I mean, these are the...."

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, this is the case of everybody being a little bit right. The -- the arms buildup into Cuba started now very long after the Bay of Pigs, and I think there is a cause and effect relationship here, I think that when the Russians saw the -- the Cubans failed at the Bay of Pigs, and the United States didn't support them, I think this may have -- I didn't see the Khrushchev show last night -- by the time the All Star Game was over, why I'd had it for the day. But I think that Khrushchev probably felt, well, the Americans didn't back the Cubans up, so I can put missiles in there with impunity. And intelligence did become increasingly concerned at the number of arms shipments going into Cuba. And John McCone, who was then the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was especially concerned. As you know, he was a shipbuilder, and an engineer, and had been the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. And he kept saying, they must be taking them in for some reason, even if we don't have the -- have the hard evidence. So, in the summer of 1962, Mr. McCone kept going to the President and Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy and alerting them to these arms ships and to the fact that we had spotted the surface to air missile sites, and what were they there to protect? Were they simply an anti-invasion -- or are they there for something more serious.

"Then when September came this 24 -- 5412 Committee special group that Bill Harris mentioned, met and discussed it and recommended to the President that he

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authorized increased U-2 flights over -- now, September, of course, is the hurricane month in the Caribbean and the weather is -- is very poor for aerial reconnaissance. It's been well written up I think...."

BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "...by all of them. But the fact is that they didn't really get the first pictures of the missiles...."

BEERS: "That really showed them on the ground, yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "...until about 72 hours after they started to build the sites. The thing that I think that was most surprising about...."

BEERS: "Well, that's pretty good, three days later, or...."

KIRKPATRICK: "I think it's quite remarkable. The thing that was surprising and I think the major surprise there, was the speed with which the Russians could build these sites. Of course the material was flowing in, and of course it was coming off the ships. But all of the reports that Senator Keating was getting, and others, were coming from Cuban refugees. And as Frank well knows from his experience in military intelligence in Yugoslavia when untrained observers see something on the road it can suddenly go from a jeep to a tank in very quick order, and from one type of missile to another type in very quick order.

"The -- my last comment is simply to say that after the action we studied all of the reports that were produced, and out of some thousands that came in, there were about 200 ground reports from ground observers on missiles, of which 19 were accurate."

BEERS: "Of 200, 19 were accurate?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Nineteen were accurate. If I remember, something in that nature. But, sure they were seeing things being carted down the road."

BEERS: "Well, this raises a general -- excuse me."

LINDSAY: "I was just going to say, I think this -- the missile crisis illustrates another point, and particularly the value of technical intelligence in photographs, in that here was objective evidence to the world that could be shown at the United Nations, of Russians actions, which was far more convincing, I think, than if it had been a written report derived from a CIA agent on the ground, which -- it could be equally correct but -- but the picture was far more convincing."

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BEERS: "Yes.

"And this kind of technology is improving all -- presumably all the time."

LINDSAY: "Presumably."

BEERS: "What about the thing we read about occasionally -- this manned orbital laboratory?"

LINDSAY: "I don't know."

BEERS: "The President has spoken about it."

LINDSAY: "He announced this I believe about a year ago, that a so-called 'mole' was to be built as a military experimental vehicle and I don't believe there've been any other reports that I have seen."

MAN: "There are a few in the press that suggest that the project's going along and that it should be launched by next year and I think the -- the unmanned space satellite efforts have shown how valuable...."

BEERS: "We've already got a satellite whizzing around up there that take these very fine grain pictures."

MAN: "Even in World War II we had fine photo reconnaissance. And it was Colonel Wright in DIA that spotted this trapezoidal pattern."

BEERS: "What's DIA?"

MAN: "The Defense Intelligence Agency. That's the one that was set up in 1961, centralizing most of the military intelligence function."

BEERS: "What was it he spotted?"

MAN: "He spotted a trapezoidal pattern on a photo reconnaissance picture which was all too familiar because it was very much like the ones that we'd spotted for years being built over the Soviet Union. And it looks as if the same part of the Soviet Defense Department which was responsible for building missiles at home, was given responsibility for building them in Cuba, and they did them in the same configuration. And that led to a follow-on U-2 flight which gave us the first hard evidence over San Cristobal (?) -- this is the Cuban missile crisis."

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BEERS: "Cuban missile crisis."

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MAN: "And that's even with -- with U-2's. And with satellites, unmanned satellites, presents some difficulties, and manned ones will, too, but there's a great deal more flexibility. And it's just one of -- it's -- aside from satellites, it's the use of computers and automatic data processing -- cutting the cost and making more accessible the information you want at the time you want it, and fitting together pieces of data which just by humans looking for them we'd never get together."

BEERS: "What about the -- what about the general political effects of different types of surveillance? I mean, let's say satellite surveillance compared with, you know, ground -- agents on the ground. I mean, do these have -- do you figure these have different effects on -- on tension between the two power blocs?"

Harris
MAN: "Yes, this is -- this is one of the most hopeful signs, really, that the new technology is much less intrusive and it's usually less visible, less embarrassing to the country that's being reported upon. And this may present some opportunities for cutting back -- not eliminating, certainly, but cutting back the priority which has been given in the past to -- to agents -- politically disturbing groups."

KIRKPATRICK: "This -- this I think is quite true, in fact, I think when Khrushchev was still in power he -- he commented that they were photographing the United States on a fairly consistent basis with their Cosmos satellites, and that they assumed the United States was doing the same to them. And -- and I think it's probably within the realm of science that sooner or later there can be constant observation of all points of the earth simultaneously, as we have the weather satellites now. From what the weather is I can't see that they're doing much good. At least we've got them. But on the other hand your -- your satellites will give you the visual observations but the human agent can never be eliminated until people can read men's minds because the decisions that men make."

BEERS: "How much weight do you put on this whole question of intention versus capability?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, I think capabilities are not too difficult to discern. I think that generally speaking in my studies and observations of intelligence, that we do fairly well on capabilities. I remember after the Battle of the Bulge -- the Ardennes (?) offensive in 1944 in Europe -- I was on General Bradley's staff at the time and we did a study afterwards -- after the war was over -- and we figured out that between the Germans and ourselves we had about 85 to 90 percent accuracy on each other's order of battle before the battle started.

"But it's -- the decision that Hitler made in September or November to launch

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that attack -- and I gather he was on a sick bed at the time, and said we're going to have a big counter-offensive, and threw everything he had into it, and nobody knew the intention because it was by word of mouth. They passed it on down to the -- first to the Army group commanders, and then the Army commanders, and then the corps and division commanders at the very last minute so that to discover that intention unless one of them was your agent was almost...."

BEERS: "I think to read Hitler's mind would be a little difficult. Not very pleasant, either, but -- what about the general question, Bill, you've studied this, I think, of the effectiveness or how do you evaluate the CIA as an intelligence agency? I mean, afterall, we imagine this as something fairly new for the United States."

Harvey
MAN: "I think probably in comparison to other countries it is relatively new. We haven't had these foreign engagements for as long a time as Great Britain or France, or Russia for that matter."

BEERS: "Do you think we've done a good job?"
James

MAN: "On balance, yes. But I think it's helpful to distinguish different branches, different functions. We didn't really get into the game until 1941 with the Office of the Coordinator of Information -- Colonel Donovan -- and then OSS in '42 picked up most of its techniques from the British, really.

"And I -- I don't know -- Frank, you were in it -- but I'd say that OSS eventually came to function quite well. Then after the war many of the best people left. A lot of the good people stayed but there wasn't that priority. And in the late '40's I think we were running a pretty weak show and -- but by say 1950, and especially in 1953, when Mr. Dulles took over -- Allen Dulles."

BEERS: "Yes."

Harvey
MAN: "The CIA started really moving. And it's been a very effective organization since then."

BEERS: "Well, now, this question here about intelligence and the more dramatic sort of thing -- the political operations -- the subverting of governments -- or, more particularly, the -- the things of this kind. It's -- it's the latter, which I suppose attract the most attention. I mean, well, did we or did we not overthrow Mossadegh in Iran in 1953? Apparently we did. Or Guatemala -- coup in Guatemala, and so on. Of course, the things we hear about there normally are the -- are the failures. Do you think there have been very many successes in that real cloak and dagger sort of field?"

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MAN: "I suppose that there -- that there have been dedicated people, professionals, and they don't talk about their successes. Sometimes they do, and it's one of my criticisms of CIA's public relations policies, which -- that from about 1945 Colonel Donovan was so interested in a centralized intelligence organization and public understanding of the need for it, he started leaking some of the better stories of OSS. And this continued in the late '40's -- there was an article or two. And then in 1954, after Mr. Dulles came in, one of the few things I criticize him for was having supported a flamboyant public relations policy. And I'd say that since about 1961 there's been a cutback on -- on this policy."

BEERS: "What kind of -- how would this, I mean -- you mean...."

MAN: "Less leaks to magazines."

BEERS: "I see, yes."

MAN: "But -- much less of that. And since Mr. Helms came in I know that they're quite conscious of the problem and have done as good a job as they can to keep down the level of noise. But there -- there are two problems -- one is just that they have this tradition behind them and a gulf now with parts of the press, so that some reporters just won't cooperate and won't be discreet. As this -- this latest NSA business shows. And there's another problem, which is that the Espionage Act of 1947 really doesn't prohibit an intelligence official when he retires from telling all. It's -- it's -- it might but the court -- the Supreme Court has not so interpreted it. And it -- it would be quite difficult. And one of the things we might usefully have would be a modification of -- of this Espionage Act -- but I don't think we'll get it now."

BEERS: "One (?) act so that it...."

MAN: "So that an official who retires is really under that act. And one reason I don't think we'll get it is because of these recent disclosures. And it's not just the intelligence disclosures but the problems with Defense Department public relations -- this so-called credibility gap and news management. And until there's greater public confidence in -- in intelligence, it will be difficult to get some of these legal devices [which will help]."

BEERS: "How -- you can't ask newspapermen to be discreet, you know -- well, discreet, but not very discreet -- that's not his job. Anybody who's ever had a newspaper reporter for a friend has found out that -- that he must remember the man's professional purpose, which is to make things public...."

MAN: "Right."

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BEERS: "...sooner or later -- usually sooner. But then how can you expect this -- you can't ask this of newspapermen."

MAN: "Well, there are some -- some of the most knowledgeable really are discreet just in what they'll publish. No one would expect them to avoid basic public policy issues -- issues which the public has a right to know about, think about, and discuss, and influence decisions on."

BEERS: "Yes."

MAN: "But in terms of technicalities and details, many are discreet. And aside -- I am not suggesting a law, in fact, the First Amendment would make many laws directly encroaching upon the rights of newsmen unconstitutional -- but laws which prohibit intelligence officials from disclosing information upon their retirement might be beneficial. And I -- I understand that there are some draft bills which are kicking about, but I don't think that the time is yet right -- not yet...."

BEERS: "Do you think these disclosures about the CIA harm -- that is, do you think attention has been -- or that operations have been moved away from the CIA toward other elements in the -- in the so-called intelligence community operations?"

KIRKPATRICK: "No. I wouldn't...."

BEERS: "Well, I mean activities...."

KIRKPATRICK: "No, I don't think so at all."

BEERS: "I mean like the National Security Agency which I know nothing about, but apparently that's at least as important as the CIA. Is that true?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, as far as its importance is concerned, I think that it's a very important agency. It deals with communications security and cryptographic matters, which is obviously very important and has always been the -- the -- it dates back from smoke signals, literally -- trying to intercept each other's communications, and goes through the era when one of our Secretaries of State abolished the black chamber with the classic comment that gentlemen don't read each other's mail."

BEERS: "What was the black chamber?"

KIRKPATRICK: "For breaking diplomatic codes."

BEERS: "Oh, I see, yes."

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KIRKPATRICK: "Other people's diplomatic codes. And he said, gentlemen don't read each other's mail, so he abolished it. I guess we've now come to the conclusion that there aren't very many gentlemen in the world, or something. But we know that the Soviets have a tremendous crypto-analytic agency and it's a very important aspect of intelligence, but increasingly difficult as communications become more sophisticated."

"But back to your basic question...."

BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "...have operations moved away from the CIA because of the revelations? My answer to that would be no, because there's nobody else in the government equipped to undertake these -- these operations. This is not to say there can't be -- the Pentagon certainly has personnel that could be trained in this area. But here again I would emphasize that the CIA and the military work exceedingly closely together. The Defense Intelligence Agency was created as -- as an organization to develop for Defense what CIA was doing for the Federal Government. They work closely together in places like Vietnam. But revelations of any intelligence nature are always damaging when they talk about operations...."

BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "...or agents, or accomplishments. Now, I don't quite agree with Bill Harris that there's a possibility in this country of having an Official Secrets Act, I just don't see it. I just don't think it would ever be passed. I think it's -- it's so contrary to our official -- to our whole national structure, that we wouldn't have it. And the press is always going to write about intelligence operations when they discover them, so the...."

LINDSAY: "That's right. And I think there's another part of that, too, is that operations have to be conceived and carried out in the atmosphere in the American -- in the American society, and atmosphere, and fully recognizing that there are effective people in the press and that if operations can't be designed to survive, if they are so visible, and if that visibility then -- if there is a severe penalty for having become visible, another way ought to be found of doing it."

BEERS: "Are we a little less -- a little less discreet, -- I mean, let's say that the British, I mean, now, when Commander Crabbe apparently went out and put on his skindiving suit, swam around under those Russian cruisers and something happened to him -- you never heard anything more about it. Well, very little about it in Britain. Do you think there's a difference there?"

LINDSAY: "I suspect that you perhaps know more than I do...."

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KIRKPATRICK: "They have an Official Secrets Act."

BEERS: "Yes."

KIRKPATRICK: "And a D Notice. And when the D Notice is out the press is not -- is -- prints anything about it at its own jeopardy. And they've had several cases in recent years of people tried and given sentences for revealing information that they learned officially.

"I -- I think that you're getting into a very important aspect which I hope we can touch on before we conclude. And that is, what does the American people want in the way of an intelligence organization? I -- my personal feeling is that there's almost a -- a very sizeable percentage of our people that feel that intelligence is a necessary evil, that we've got to get intelligence, and we've got to learn what's going on in the world because there are evil forces in the world that are perhaps conspiring against us. Having said that, I think that when you move into the second phase, which is the action phase -- that is, taking action to support policy, public support diminishes to a degree. On the other hand, I -- it would be my opinion -- I'm simply throwing this out more to evoke an argument or a discussion, that there are considerable numbers of people in this country who feel as Mr. Rusk has indicated in testimony before Congress, that the back alley fighting is necessary in the world today -- that we can't simply move out of the streets of the world ideological battle and leave it solely to the possession of the others."

MAN: "But I don't. Also just a personal view, which is, that although I would not advocate removing ourselves from the back alley fight, that we should also recognize that there has been some kind of a thaw in the Cold War -- not that the Cold War's over -- but that it -- it leads to -- to a need to revamp and to take another look and to see whether we might not be able to pull out of some operations, not all of them, very selectively. But see what we might not now do morally. And I think that, for example, vix a vix eastern Europe, there's a possibility for much better relations. And many of the operations which made a great deal of sense in the late 40's and early 50's may not be so...."

BEERS: (one or two words lost in confusion of voices)...."Operations here, Bill...."

MAN: "...political action -- so-called black propaganda -- unacknowledged radio stations and the like."

BEERS: "This is different from -- just -- although it's connected to the sheer intelligence gathering."

MAN: "It's part of the intelligence mission. It's not part of the information collecting mission...."

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BEERS: "Right."

MAN: "...but it's related. And we may have to take a look and just be sure that these intelligence activities doesn't get in the way of a rapprochement. And having done that, we'll still probably find that we want to continue in many important areas. And in fact, now that the thermo-nuclear stalemate makes it difficult to engage in the higher levels of violence there's going to be more pressure to engage in some of these less violent activities. So it may mean we have to increase some of these covert activites in some parts of the world and in some areas."

BEERS: "How about this question -- this really is related to this classic debate you were speaking of, Frank, of whether you should have operations connected with information gathering. Isn't that a way of putting it?"

LINDSAY: "Yes, I think so. I think this has been an argument that has raged for years and years. There are those who argue that the intelligence functions should be completely separated from any -- any covert political action or para-military operation. There are those who argue on the other side that the only possible way is to have them together. Neither solution is -- is wholly satisfactory. The argument of course made for separation is that you have an independent intelligence operation as a -- as a check and that the danger believed that -- that if the same people run it they will collect intelligence and evaluate intelligence to support their -- their operation."

BEERS: "Wasn't this said about the Bay of Pigs, that -- that the CIA at the same time was organizing the people to go in, at the same time was assessing the chances of success."

LINDSAY: "On the other hand, the British tried in World War II having these two activities separate, and they felt, as a result of World War II experience that they were better together. And one of the reasons is that it's generally believed that if you are operating against the intelligence forces of another nation if these are divided, you have a much easier job and a better job of getting after them and penetrating -- the counter espionage."

KIRKPATRICK: "And there's the -- the competition for agents, I mean, people just think agents grow on trees. They're very difficult to come by and that -- you can go out in Hong Kong or Berlin, or centers like that and probably get many agents, but they won't be very useful because they will be selling their wares. What you need are the people that can covertly do the job."

"So that there's competition between your two types of effort -- your intelligence gathering, and your action.

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BEERS: "How about the Russians -- how do they do this? Is their organization like ours?"

KIRKPATRICK: "Well, the Russians have a dual intelligence setup. They have their general staff -- the Department of the General Staff -- the so-called GRU, is their military intelligence. But the key foreign intelligence agency is the State Security Committee -- the KGB as it is now -- it's gone through a whole series of names (speaks in Russian) NKVD, and so on. They generally combine everything in that. They have the Disinformation Bureau, which picks on our security agencies as one of its favorite targets. Their effort is adverse propoganda -- black propoganda -- to tear them down. And they have -- they even have an assassination squad. But their action is all built into their intelligence collection system which also is state security. They have -- they are the supreme authorities over all state security. And it's sufficiently important that the central committee itself approves of the nominations for their intelligence chiefs...."

BEERS: "You say they have a bigger organization, I mean, we -- I suppose, altogether, according to this article, the whole intelligence community gets -- spends something like three billion dollars a year. That sound roughly right?"

MAN: "About the right general figures."

BEERS: "Not CIA, but all...."

MAN: "The actual amount is highly classified. But...."

BEERS: "Yes."

MAN: "...just quickly I'd like to mention that since we've concentrated on CIA."

BEERS: "Yes."

MAN: "That the United States intelligence board, UCID (?) includes the National Security Agency, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission,...."

LINDSAY: "The State Department."

MAN: "...and the State Department, INR, which does a great deal of work."

BEERS: "Well, we've got a minute to go. Would you like to say anything in conclusion about what you think any changes that ought to be made in the way the CIA

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operates, or in its public relations, its relations to Congress, or the public, as it is in a bit of a trouble now. Have you any ideas on this, Frank, you'd like to offer?"

LINDSAY: "I think the only thing that I would say -- and I'm sure people are seriously considering this -- is for those political activities which are perfectly acceptable -- let's try to find as a society a way of supporting these publicly in ways that cause no embarrassment or discredit to our organizations here and abroad."

BEERS: "And how about more -- could there be more discussion of the CIA, do you think it would help?"

KIRKPATRICK: "I think the Congress can help here. I'd like to see the Congress take a greater interest in CIA and if -- if nothing more than issue an annual report that they reviewed the work, and that they find it satisfactory or that they've indicated places it can be improved. I think this would help public understanding."

BEERS: "Thanks very much. We're winding up our discussion of the CIA. And I want to conclude by mentioning our -- our program for next week."

ANNOUNCER: "Tonight you have heard Brattle Street Forum, presented in cooperation with Harvard University Summer School, with Samuel Beer, Professor of Law at Harvard as moderator. The guests were Franklin Lindsay, president of Itech (?) ~~ITER~~ Corporation, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Professor of Political Science, Brown University, and William Harris, Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University."